Chapter 2
Application Layer



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Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR

Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach
6th edition
Jim Kurose, Keith Ross
Addison-Wesley
March 2012

DNS: domain name system

people: many identifiers:

- SSN, name, passport #

Internet hosts, routers:

- IP address (32 bit) - used for addressing datagrams
- "name", e.g., www.yahoo.com - used by humans

Q: how to map between IP address and name, and vice versa ?

Domain Name System:

- *distributed database* implemented in hierarchy of many *name servers*
- *application-layer protocol:* hosts, name servers communicate to *resolve* names (address/name translation)
  - note: core Internet function, implemented as application-layer protocol
  - complexity at network's "edge"

DNS: services, structure

DNS services

- hostname to IP address translation
- host aliasing
  - canonical, alias names
- mail server aliasing
- load distribution
  - replicated Web servers: many IP addresses correspond to one name

why not centralize DNS?

- single point of failure
- traffic volume
- distant centralized database
- maintenance

A: doesn't scale!

DNS: a distributed, hierarchical database



client wants IP for www.amazon.com; 1st approx:

- client queries root server to find com DNS server
- client queries .com DNS server to get amazon.com DNS server
- client queries amazon.com DNS server to get IP address for www.amazon.com

DNS: root name servers

- contacted by local name server that can not resolve name
- root name server:
  - contacts authoritative name server if name mapping not known
  - gets mapping
  - returns mapping to local name server



13 root name "servers" worldwide

TLD, authoritative servers

top-level domain (TLD) servers:

- responsible for com, org, net, edu, aero, jobs, museums, and all top-level country domains, e.g.: uk, fr, ca, jp
- Network Solutions maintains servers for .com TLD
- Educause for .edu TLD

authoritative DNS servers:

- organization' s own DNS server(s), providing authoritative hostname to IP mappings for organization' s named hosts
- can be maintained by organization or service provider

Local DNS name server

- does not strictly belong to hierarchy
- each ISP (residential ISP, company, university) has one
  - also called "default name server"
- when host makes DNS query, query is sent to its local DNS server
  - has local cache of recent name-to-address translation pairs (but may be out of date!)
  - acts as proxy, forwards query into hierarchy

DNS name resolution example

- host at cis.poly.edu wants IP address for gaia.cs.umass.edu

iterated query:

- contacted server replies with name of server to contact
- "I don't know this name, but ask this server"



DNS name resolution example

recursive query:

- puts burden of name resolution on contacted name server
- heavy load at upper levels of hierarchy?



DNS: caching, updating records

- once (any) name server learns mapping, it *caches* mapping
  - cache entries timeout (disappear) after some time (TTL)
  - TLD servers typically cached in local name servers
    - thus root name servers not often visited
- cached entries may be *out-of-date* (best effort name-to-address translation!)
  - if name host changes IP address, may not be known Internet-wide until all TTLs expire
- update/notify mechanisms proposed IETF standard
  - RFC 2136

DNS records

DNS: distributed db storing resource records (RR)

RR format: `(name, value, type, ttl)`

type=A

- **`name`** is hostname
- **`value`** is IP address

type=NS

- **`name`** is domain (e.g., foo.com)
- **`value`** is hostname of authoritative name server for this domain

type=CNAME

- **`name`** is alias name for some "canonical" (the real) name
- **`www.ibm.com`** is really **`servereast.backup2.ibm.com`**
- **`value`** is canonical name

type=MX

- **`value`** is name of mailserver associated with **`name`**

DNS protocol, messages

- *query* and *reply* messages, both with same *message format*

msg header

- identification: 16 bit # for query, reply to query uses same #
- flags:
  - query or reply
  - recursion desired
  - recursion available
  - reply is authoritative



DNS protocol, messages



Inserting records into DNS

- example: new startup "Network Utopia"
- register name networkuptopia.com at *DNS registrar* (e.g., Network Solutions)
  - provide names, IP addresses of authoritative name server (primary and secondary)
  - registrar inserts two RRs into .com TLD server:
    `(networkutopia.com, dns1.networkutopia.com, NS)`
    `(dns1.networkutopia.com, 212.212.212.1, A)`
- create authoritative server type A record for www.networkuptopia.com; type MX record for networkutopia.com

Attacking DNS

DDoS attacks

- Bombard root servers with traffic
  - Not successful to date
  - Traffic Filtering
  - Local DNS servers cache IPs of TLD servers, allowing root server bypass
- Bombard TLD servers
  - Potentially more dangerous

Redirect attacks

- Man-in-middle
  - Intercept queries
- DNS poisoning
  - Send bogus relies to DNS server, which caches

Exploit DNS for DDoS

- Send queries with spoofed source address: target IP
- Requires amplification